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8. The so-called “Non-Identity Problem” introduces further reasons 
why it is difficult to generalize about disability’s comparative 
value, though this issue is beyond the scope of this essay.
9. Some disabilities may essentially involve features that are, 
arguably, intrinsically good or bad for a person. Examples may 
include fibromyalgia or major depression.
10. For more discussion of this point, see Campbell and Stramondo, 
“The Complicated Relationship of Disability and Well-Being.”
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ABSTRACT
Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) is a very rare 
condition describing those with an intense desire or need 
to move from a state of ability to relative impairment, 
typically through the amputation of one or more limbs. 
In this paper, I draw upon research in critical disability 
studies and philosophy of disability to critique arguments 
based upon the principle of nonmaleficence against such 
surgery. I demonstrate how the action-relative concept of 
harm in such arguments relies upon suspect notions of 
biological and statistical normality, and I contend that each 
fail to provide normative guidance. I then propose a critical 
theory of harm, one marked by substantive engagement 
with both empirical and reflective inquiry across the 
sciences, social sciences, and humanities. I conclude by 
discussing implications of a critical theory of harm and how 
it might enrich ongoing debates in bioethics, philosophy of 
disability, and the health humanities more broadly.
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Unless we can put ourselves in the place of another, 
unless we can enlarge our own perspective through 
an imaginative encounter with the experience 
of others, unless we can let our own values and 
ideals be called into question from various points 
of view, we cannot be morally sensitive.
–Mark Johnson1
that, despite the wide variation across and within disability 
categories, most disabilities are neither intrinsically good 
nor intrinsically bad for an individual. With some possible 
exceptions,9 they are intrinsically neutral. This should not be 
a very controversial claim in light of the fact that the leading 
theories of well-being (hedonism, desire-fulfillment theory, 
perfectionism, and objective list theory), which purport to 
tell us what things are intrinsically and basically good or 
bad for us, do not identify disabilities as being intrinsically 
good or bad for us.10 So, the Standard View is false on the 
intrinsic interpretation as well.
4. CONCLUSION
The Standard View tells us that being disabled tends to be 
a bad for a person. We have offered a partial explanation of 
why we cannot make true generalizations about disability’s 
instrumental or comparative goodness, badness, or 
neutrality. This gives us reason to reject the Standard View 
on the instrumental and comparative interpretations. The 
intrinsic interpretation of the Standard View should also be 
rejected, though not because it is impossible to make a 
true generalization about the intrinsic value of disability. 
The reason is simply that it is far more plausible that most 
disabilities are intrinsically neutral. Beyond that claim, we 
should resist the temptation to make broad and simple 
generalizations about the relationship between disability 
and well-being.
NOTES
1. Ron Amundson, “Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life: A Bias 
in Biomedical Ethics,” 103.
2. See Stephen M. Campbell and Joseph A. Stramondo, “The 
Complicated Relationship of Disability and Well-Being,” which 
is forthcoming in a special issue of Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal. In that essay, we offer a systematic and detailed critique 
of the Standard View, discuss a probabilistic variant of the 
Standard View, and examine some practical implications of our 
conclusions about the relationship between disability and well-
being.
3. Here we follow Barnes, “Valuing Disability, Causing Disability.”
4. This is a variation of an example presented in Amundson, 
“Disability, Ideology, and Quality of Life: A Bias in Biomedical 
Ethics,” 109.
5. Granted, it is possible to have a high-impact trait whose effects 
are so harmful (e.g., causing agony and an early death) that it 
will consistently ruin the life of anyone who has it. Those can 
be cases where a high-impact trait and variations needn’t yield 
great variation in well-being. However, a modest amount of 
empirical observation reveals that most disabilities are not like 
that. They are compatible with achieving many of the things 
widely regarded to be the goods of life, and there are countless 
cases in which individuals with disabilities have lives that would 
be regarded prudentially good on any remotely plausible view of 
well-being.
6. To qualify as overall instrumentally bad for a person, a thing must 
involve a greater balance of instrumental harm (leads to intrinsic 
bads, prevents intrinsic goods) over instrumental benefit (leads 
to intrinsic goods, prevents intrinsic bads). A similar qualification 
applies to intrinsic badness.
7. A clarification about our use of “neutral.” In the context of 
discussing well-being, this term is most naturally taken to refer 
to the space between prudential goodness (what is good for a 
person) and prudential badness (what is bad for a person). To 
say that a trait is neutral in this sense is to say that it is either 
(i) neither good nor bad for a person, or (ii) good and bad for 
the person to roughly the same extent. This is how we will 
understand and use the term “neutral.”
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critical theory of harm defined by substantive engagement 
with both empirical and reflective inquiry across the 
sciences, social sciences, and humanities. I conclude by 
discussing implications of a critical theory of harm and 
how it might enrich ongoing debates about the relation of 
disability to harm and well-being in bioethics, philosophy 
of disability, and the health humanities more broadly.
I. TRANSABILITY — BIID (BODY INTEGRITY 
IDENTITY DISORDER)
You wake up in a cold sweat. A hand lays dead upon your 
face. After a few hazy seconds of delirium, you realize it is 
your own. But it is also not your own. It is “asleep,” as one 
says, and while one knows perfectly well that it is one’s 
own hand, “it” feels unwelcome and alien. In this moment 
of derecognition of one’s body, one perhaps approaches, 
however imperfectly, the experience of transability or BIID: 
body integrity identity disorder.7
BIID is a rare condition characterized by an intense desire 
or need to move from a given state of ability to one of 
relative impairment, most often through amputation.8 As 
Sabine Müller notes, “psychologists, psychiatrists, and 
neurologists offer quite different explanations for the 
amputation desire: they discuss whether it is a neurotic 
disorder, an obsessive-compulsion disorder, an identity 
disorder like transsexuality, or a neurological conflict 
between a person’s anatomy and body image, which could 
stem from damage to a part of the brain that constructs 
the body image in map-like form.”9 That is to say, there is 
serious disagreement over the nature, definition, diagnosis, 
etiology, and prognosis of BIID. Since around 2008, cognitive 
neuroscientists have argued that, at least in some cases, it is 
a neurological, body-mapping problem caused by a failure 
to represent one or more limbs in the right superior parietal 
lobule.10 It should be noted that the scientific literature 
focuses far more often on limb amputation than other 
forms of transability (including blindness and deafness) 
and also that within the transabled community, well-known 
hierarchies of disability appear. For example, no one is 
reported to desire epilepsy or cystic fibrosis; none desire 
an “invisible” disability or an “unhealthy” disability, to use 
Susan Wendell’s indispensable distinction.11 The question 
of the desirability of a given embodied condition is thus 
front and center. There is disagreement whether those with 
BIID simply desire (or need) to be impaired in a specific 
manner; whether they desire to be socially disabled such 
that they are recognized to have a certain identity, the 
privileges and stigmas attendant with it, and are afforded 
participation in the relevant communities; whether they 
simply desire their body to be “in alignment” with how 
they “feel” their body should be; whether and how this 
relates to erotic desire either of themselves or others as 
amputees; whether it is some combination of these factors; 
or whether the desire is something else entirely. Bioethics 
literature, however, by and large assumes this desire to be 
pathological in nature, whatever its explanation.
Take the example of deafness by contrast. A number 
of decades ago, the desire to be deaf would likely have 
been pathologized across the normative board. Yet, with 
increased awareness of Deaf (with a capital D) culture, 
When I judge the other, I simultaneously direct 
toward her that stream of negative affect that cuts 
off my feeling of kinship from her as a fellow living, 
suffering, joyful creature.
–Teresa Brennan2
Normative ethical theories have historically emphasized 
their principles while deemphasizing their exemplars.3 
In other words, whether framed as a question of virtue, 
duty, or utility, such theories focus more on the ideals that 
determine the worth of ethical action and less on the people 
for whom such action is intended to be praiseworthy.4 This 
is not merely to say that Aristotle, Kant, and Mill, and, often, 
their followers operate with insufficient or problematic 
accounts of subjectivity or assumptions about human 
nature—a claim scholars in feminist theory, critical race 
theory, and critical disability studies, among other fields, 
have argued at length for years. Following Gregor Wolbring, 
I find it illuminating to frame this more specifically as a 
neglect of the role abilities and ability expectations play 
in normative ethical theorizing.5 Such neglect has led to 
wide-ranging oppression and discrimination, including and 
especially the historical, systematic exclusion of people 
with disabilities from all canonical models of flourishing.
Normative theories implicitly assume that ethical 
exemplars (whether Aristotle’s phronimos, Kant’s good-
willed rationalist, or Mill’s sensing calculator) possess 
certain abilities. Although typically underdetermined and 
undertheorized, these abilities prove determinate for the 
content and form of the ideals to which the respective 
ethical subject is prescriptively beholden. Depending upon 
the historical epoch or author in question, these abilities 
might be demarcated as or at least assume specific forms of 
“rational” thought, ambulation, hearing, seeing, speaking, 
emotional regulation, or any number of abilities afforded 
by class position, gender, sexuality, race, locale, and so on. 
In this paper, I focus on experience that in many respects 
blurs the lines of ability and disability: transability or BIID. It 
is an experience that unsettles intuitions concerning which 
abilities matter, how they matter, and why they matter at 
all. It is an experience that gets to the heart of how we think 
a body should be to be good and to do good. It is thus an 
experience that, by my lights, prompts a reevaluation of not 
only canonical ethical ideals and exemplars, but also the 
lived experience of being subject to the assumptions and 
prescriptions of normative theorizing.
While a significant literature in bioethics and other fields has 
arisen around BIID, only a small portion engages the breadth 
of work across critical disability studies and philosophy of 
disability, a tendency sadly and problematically still true of 
much bioethics literature more generally.6 In this paper, I 
draw upon the latter fields to contribute to arguments for 
the support of surgeries for people with BIID. Because I 
find extant positive arguments persuasive, I here provide 
a negative account that critiques arguments based upon 
the principle of nonmaleficence against such surgery. I 
demonstrate how the action-relative concept of harm in 
such arguments relies upon suspect concepts of biological 
and statistical normality, and I contend that each fail to 
provide normative guidance. I then propose and outline a 
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to be morally sensitive in the way Mark Johnson outlines 
in the opening epigraph. When applied to BIID, however, 
the problem emerges quite clearly. If one cannot possibly 
imagine wanting to be disabled, one cannot determine how 
one would want to be treated if one experiences BIID. As 
Anita Silvers notes, “our aversion to the very idea of being 
disabled forestalls our understanding the disabled from 
their perspective.”17 Indeed, it forestalls our understanding 
of human corporeal variation and experience tout court. 
The golden rule fails to have prescriptive force when one 
cannot imagine another’s situation as the other testifies 
to experiencing it. Implicit in Cooper’s comment and 
the ensuing applause is not just disbelief in the veracity 
of White’s claims about her own experience, but a more 
thoroughgoing incredulity regarding the very possibility of 
her desire.
That desiring disability is culturally unimaginable is 
demonstrated in part through the widespread and vitriolic 
stigmatization of surgery for BIID. In 2000, an article in The 
Atlantic was titled “A New Way to Be Mad.”18 In June 2015, 
an online article in the National Review ran the click-bait 
headline “Bruce Jenner’s Sex Change Is Self-Mutilation” for 
a piece entitled “People Who Cut Off Their Own Limbs (and 
Their Enablers),” wherein the author uses the example of 
transabled surgery to discount transgender surgery.19 If one 
can only image a desire as pathological, one cannot imagine 
that desire as authentic. One can hide intolerance plainly in 
sight through the bastion of pathologization. Put otherwise, 
if another’s desire for X is judged by one as possible only if 
something is “wrong” with that person, one’s judgment of 
that person and their desire is shifted outside the auspices 
of social acceptability and typical constraints on moral 
praxis, specifically constraints which pertain to individual 
differences, choices, and the like. However, the moment 
one questions the norms and principles upon which such 
judgment is based, it is possible that oneself, not the other, 
is morally culpable.
Before I further address the role of pathologization with 
respect to transability, an important caveat is in order. I 
above defined BIID as a “rare condition characterized by an 
intense desire or need to move from a given state of ability 
to one of relative impairment, often through amputation.” 
I used the term impairment as a way of signaling the 
distinction common in disability studies between 
“disability” and “impairment,” typically referred to as the 
“social model” of disability.20 “Impairment” indicates one’s 
particular embodied condition and “disability” names the 
social ramifications of a given impairment, ranging from 
stigma to oppression to numerous forms of inaccessibility 
or unequal access. With that distinction in mind, no one with 
BIID, as far as I’m aware, describes a desire for disability 
per se. Yet, tellingly, part of the resistance to support 
for surgery for people diagnosed with BIID is precisely 
through a conflation of that distinction. People living with 
disabilities who experience typical disability stigma might 
feel as though one with BIID who desires impairment is 
not sensitive to the extent to which that impairment will 
bring about significant negative social effects. However, 
testimony from people with BIID suggests this concern is 
ill-founded.21
it is well documented that deafness is experienced by 
numerous people as a positive and intrinsically valuable 
cultural identity, not as audiological lack or loss. To my 
knowledge, no commentators regarded as “pathological” 
the desires of the couple who in 2004 made international 
headlines for wanting to select for a child with deafness for 
an IVF procedure.12 The debates revolved largely around 
the ethics of that desire relative to the ableist world in 
which we live. Yet, if a congenitally hearing person desired 
or needed to alter their body such that they no longer hear, 
would this not be considered pathological and categorized 
as a form of BIID? But what if the desire to do so were 
expressed in terms of “deaf gain,” i.e., gaining the ability 
to more fully participate in Deaf culture?13
Unsurprisingly, BIID raises a host of obdurate quandaries 
for ethicists. Take, for example, the questions BIID raises 
in relation to identity and desire. As public discussions 
surrounding Laverne Cox, Caitlyn Jenner, and Rachel 
Dolezal attest, our “Western” cultural imaginary can make 
at least some space for the desire to “transition” to another 
gender identity and even (though far less so) between 
racial identities. Unsurprisingly, people disagree over the 
nature, legitimacy, and appropriateness of that desire, but 
the desire itself is, on the whole, imaginable. There seems 
to be, on the contrary, no such space for the desire of 
disability.
One of the more famous spokespeople for BIID is Chloe-
Jennings White. She has actively and for years sought 
a surgeon to sever her spinal cord so that she might 
become paraplegic, and she has experienced the desire 
for paraplegia since she was a small child. For years, she 
has used a wheelchair because it feels “right” to her in a 
way that being upright and ambulating does not. While 
appearing as a guest on Anderson Cooper’s CNN show, 
“360,” at one point Cooper comments that White’s desire to 
become paraplegic is “completely inappropriate” relative to 
those for whom paraplegia is not a choice.14 The audience 
responds with applause. As disability studies scholar Fiona 
Kumari Campbell frames discussions over BIID, the desire 
for disability is (today) simply too transgressive.15 It is not 
simply that in “choosing” to be “disabled” one is desiring an 
object that the able-bodied majority do not find desirable; 
it is that one is desiring that which is thought to limit and 
counter desire itself—that which from the perspective of 
ableism can only be experienced as a constraint, as an 
unsolicited and unwelcome restriction, and, for that reason, 
as something to be actively avoided, repulsed by, or even 
feared.
One might counter that Anderson Cooper, his audience, 
and all those who might applaud at the inappropriateness 
of White’s desire are simply failing to be empathetic. One 
might counter that such persons should employ the golden 
rule: do onto others as you would have them do unto you. 
Bracketing whether or not healthcare practitioners (HCPs) 
should perform therapeutic amputation for people with 
BIID, if one were in White’s situation, would one not want 
such a surgery? The golden rule appears in some form in 
nearly every religious tradition across history, and part of 
its power, I would contend, is in its implicit exhortation 
to imagine oneself in the other’s situation.16 It asks one 
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seven published responses to Müller’s article, just three 
definitively support the surgery, either as a last resort or as 
the only viable resort available today.29 Those that do not 
support the surgery rely more heavily upon the concept of 
harm.30
For example, in their response to Müller’s piece, Jolkowitz 
and Zivotofsky write, “the majority opinion [in Jewish Law, 
the perspective out of which their article is framed] permits 
cosmetic surgery based on the obligation to ‘love your 
neighbor like yourself’—in our mind, it is hard to argue that 
therapeutic amputation is an act of ‘loving your neighbor.’”31 
The implication is that therapeutic amputation is neither an 
act of love nor a neutral act, but one of harm. No argument 
is given for this claim. Müller appears, at times, to hold a 
similar view. Explaining the difference between GID and 
BIID, she writes, “genital surgeries on transsexuals aims for 
a normal, social [sic] accepted, not disabled form of human 
existence.”32 Müller appears to here uncritically utilize the 
widely assailed medical model of disability, under which 
disability is considered an individual misfortune or tragedy 
resulting from genetic or environmental insult. Therapeutic 
amputation constitutes a harm for Müller because, unlike 
genital reassignment surgery, it seeks disability: that 
which is presumably a harm, abnormal, and not socially 
accepted.33
Upon critical reflection concerning the meaning of “normal” 
and “socially accepted,” it is not clear how Müller’s 
argument holds up. While, for the sake of argument, one 
could claim that the end-goal of genital surgery correlates 
to a “normal” sex/gender binary, the desire to surgically 
change one’s sexual anatomy, in and of itself, is today 
neither “normal,” nor “socially acceptable” in any general 
sense of those terms.34 Furthermore, depending upon 
social judgment of one’s physical appearance, dressing 
in clothing that aligns with social norms corresponding 
to a sex-assignment surgery might make one a target for 
hate crimes and significant social ostracization because of 
an “abnormal” and socially “unacceptable” appearance. 
By deploying a concept of disability wherein disability 
is conflated with harm—whether the “harm” of genetic 
defect, acute injury, chronic disease, or what have you—
Müller’s arguments traffic in ableism and disability stigma, 
however unwittingly. The argument is ableist, to be clear, 
insofar as it assumes, without evidence or argumentation, 
that the “standard” able-body is, ceteris paribus, in and of 
itself better than the non-standard, disabled body.35
Jozsef Kovacks, also working with a medical model of 
disability, argues against Müller that both GID and BIID 
create “from a healthy body a seriously disabled one” insofar 
as GID causes an “invisible, but very serious disability” by 
depriving an otherwise “healthy person from the possibility 
to reproduce.”36 Setting aside whether or not—or how—GID 
is an instance of disability, Kovacks then goes on to clarify 
that since most HCPs support sex-reassignment surgery, the 
“paternalistic prohibition to provide surgery for BIID patients 
mirrors our own aversion of physical disabilities.”37 Kovacks 
concludes, “if BIID is a valid psychiatric disorder, then BIID 
sufferers do not exchange their health for disability. They 
exchange the suffering caused by their mental disorder 
for the suffering caused by a physical disability.” Although 
Given the prevalence of different types of disability-based 
cultural practices and identities, from various disability 
sports to the Neurodiversity movement to Deaf culture, 
why don’t more people with BIID explain their experience in 
terms of a cultural identity—as opposed to solely needing 
or desiring to change their bodily form to fit how they feel 
“in” their body? One explanation has to do with the current 
state of medical institutions, which are constitutively 
formed by what Jennifer Scuro terms the “ableist affections 
[of] neoliberal politics,” i.e., the ableism embedded in the 
consumerist swath of neoliberal values and the multitude 
of its geopolitical effects.22 Given this state of affairs, it is 
only through the pathologization of the experience of BIID 
that such people can take safe steps to bring their bodily 
identity into alignment with their bodily form. Insurance, 
for example, typically won’t cover procedures if they 
are not officially related to a documented and medically 
accepted “condition.” Another explanation is that even 
for this unique set of people who are seeking to impair 
themselves and thereby move into a state of disability in the 
social sense, even they are under the influence of various 
forms of disability stigma. Alternatively, perhaps instead 
of mere disability stigma, they are under the influence of 
the more encompassing ideology of the ableist conflation: 
the assumption that anything deemed a “disability” is 
intrinsically defined by and experienced as a “lack” and 
thereby a harm with respect to potential well-being.23 For 
example, while it may be possible for there to be a blind 
community (based upon shared experiences), the idea of 
blind culture (the gainful, rich, and unique experiences 
relating to blindness that those who are sighted lack) might 
remain doubtful under such auspices. But, given evidence 
from the lives of people who experience blindness, 
that doubtfulness is itself doubtful and, I would argue, 
ultimately grounded upon ableist assumptions.24 Having 
now discussed BIID and some of ethical issues it raises, I 
will turn to analyze arguments from harm against surgery 
designed to address it.
II. ARGUMENTS FROM HARM AGAINST BIID 
SURGERY
Although harm is undeniably a central moral 
notion, it is not yet well understood.
–Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu25
Arguments against surgery for BIID are often based on 
the principle of nonmaleficence, which holds that an HCP 
should not cause harm or injury to a patient, whether by 
acts of commission or omission.26 This principle, enshrined 
in bioethics literature by Beauchamp and Childress’ field-
defining Principles of Biomedical Ethics, dates at least back 
to the Hippocratic Oath.27 An influential article from 2009 
in The American Journal of Bioethics by Sabine Müller, 
entitled “Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID)—Is the 
Amputation of Healthy Limbs Ethically Justified?” draws 
upon this principle in order to argue against a symptomatic 
approach to BIID. Müller contends that while surgery for 
elective amputation cures the primary symptom of BIID 
(the feeling of having an unintegrated limb), it does not 
address its underlying neurological cause.28 She thus 
ultimately argues against surgery for BIID patients. Of the 
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of the intuitions in question? If so, it holds no more 
normative weight than any set of intuitions do, and I am 
not convinced intuitions, in and of themselves, hold any 
prima facie normative weight, whatever their descriptive 
value.40 Even if one takes moral intuitions as bearing 
upon the methodological origins of a naturalized ethical 
inquiry into normativity, that they are intuitions about a 
historically oppressed group makes them suspect for any 
critical inquiry, naturalized or not. Given the horrifying and 
deeply entrenched history of ableism across intellectual 
traditions, East and West, any responsible ethicist should 
be profoundly distrustful of philosophical intuitions 
about disability and, a fortiori, intuitions about disability 
originating from non-disabled people.41 And, as I argue 
in more detail below, the concept of harm (as with the 
concept of “severity” or “disease” or a host of other terms 
deployed today by too many bioethicists without sufficient 
critical analysis) is long overdue for critical inquiry if it is 
to avoid not only the ableist, but also the racist, sexist, 
and classist, et al., medical practices and theories against 
which bioethics historically arose as a distinct discipline in 
the first place.
The fulcrum of the WSN appears shortly thereafter: 
“limitations of resources mean that we can rarely promote 
wellbeing in all possible ways. We have to choose . . . 
this is a question about distributive justice” (325). But 
limited resources mark an empirical condition pertaining 
to the application of normative principles—that there are 
limited resources does not itself help one determine which 
resources should be allocated to whom or in what quantity. 
Thus, I agree that statistical normality is important, but it 
is important for descriptive ethics, not normative ethics. 
Because K&S, it seems to me, ultimately end up slipping 
from the descriptive to the normative in their assessment 
of the worth, however limited, of statistical normality—the 
way and extent to which it “matters,” as they put it—they 
oversell its import. To take another example, they claim, “to 
the extent that items on (1) [severe intellectual impairment, 
paraplegia, blindness, or early death] tend to make 
people’s lives significantly worse than the lives of most 
others, considerations of justice might give priority to the 
prevention or correction of these conditions.” That would 
be a consideration derived from descriptions of states 
of affairs in the world, not normative considerations or 
principles.42 It might suffice as grounds for policy-makers 
or politicians who seek to appease what they imagine as 
their constituency, but it is not a ground for ethicists.
All sorts of things tend to make people’s lives significantly 
worse under current states of affairs (some such things, 
for example, pertain to race, gender/sex, ethnicity, 
religion, class, geographical location, etc.), but ethicists 
today do not attribute intrinsic moral worth to many such 
tendencies and for good normative reasons. To repeat, 
given the prevalence of ableism, ethicists concerned about 
questions pertaining to disability and normativity should 
have a prima facie distrust of descriptive accounts of well-
being pertaining to disability originating from or primarily 
informed by the experience of the non-disabled. This 
holds as well for accounts originating from people with 
disabilities who have not been exposed to anti-ableist ways 
of thinking and disability-positive communities.
I find Kovacks’ argument more convincing than Müller’s 
and less problematic in certain respects, the lack of rigor 
and awareness with respect to the concept of disability is 
glaring in the work of both authors. The assumption that 
the primary or most relevant differences introduced by 
therapeutic amputation-related impairments are questions 
of individual physiology and not societal conditions ignores 
the very foundation of the disability rights movement as 
well as over fifty years of disability studies scholarship 
ranging across the humanities and social sciences. This 
body of work and activism suggests that in numerous 
cases of disability, it is societal conditions that primarily 
and negatively affect the flourishing of people with various 
impairments.38 That is to say, especially once one takes 
into serious consideration the empirical contingency of 
current forms of material-social environments and the 
various accesses they afford, hinder, or prohibit, the harm 
is often less the impairment, if at all, and more the societal 
configuration and responses to non-normate embodiment. 
Taking this seriously would mean, for example, that one is 
also or perhaps even more concerned about wheelchair 
accessibility, disability rights, and social discrimination for 
a post-amputation Chloe-Jennings White than one is about 
the ethics of that amputation.
III. NORMALITY AND HARM
If, as the discussion above demonstrates, some bioethicists 
deploy an uncritical concept of harm in relation to 
understandings of disability and, by extension, BIID, what 
of those who analyze the concept of harm itself? In “The 
Concept of Harm and the Significance of Normality,” Guy 
Kahane and Julian Savulescu [K&S] work to understand the 
normative difference between varying phenomena people 
claim as harmful or potentially so.39 They note that while 
there is strong intuitive or common sense support for claims 
that (1) the presence of severe intellectual impairment, 
paraplegia, blindness, or early death are harms, claims 
that (2) lacking a statistically high IQ, great artistic talent, 
or longevity below 130 do not have such support. The 
relevant difference in the examples, they argue, appears to 
be biological normality. Yet, and this is crucial, they dismiss 
biological normality outright as normatively relevant. “The 
moral insignificance of biological normality and abnormality 
seems so obvious on reflection, is so widely accepted, and 
has been vigorously and, to our mind, conclusively argued, 
that we will simply assume it here” (320). They instead argue 
that while “normality does matter,” it doesn’t do so in “the 
way many assume.” There is “no deep intrinsic normative 
difference between the items on (1) and (2), yet [one can] 
still hold that there are nevertheless morally important 
differences between the two lists.” “Statistical normality,” 
they continue, “while lacking inherent moral significance, 
can nevertheless matter derivatively.” I’ll call this the weak 
statistical normativity [WSN] argument: statistical normality 
provides, or at least tracks, a thin, derivative, and “non-
intrinsically moral” measure for normative judgments (323). 
My aim is to show that the WSN is not normative; statistical 
normality is merely descriptive. Like biological normality, it 
should be dismissed as a normative ground.
Of what, precisely, is weak statistical normality derivative? 
It can’t be derivative of biological normality, since that 
was rejected as having moral significance. Is it derivative 
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to be or not be worth living. Given the pervasiveness of 
ableism, substantial disability education (including, but not 
limited to, literatures in critical disability studies, disability 
life writing, and philosophy of disability) is needed to 
even begin to understand what it might mean to live a life 
involving congenital blindness, Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, 
or specific forms of autism, for example, much less the 
normative considerations concerning the possibility of 
selecting for or against such forms of life.
I agree with K&S that “we need the concept of harm for both 
explanatory and predictive purposes (its theoretical use), 
and to mark certain kinds of reasons for action and attitude 
(its normative use)” (323). But, as I have demonstrated, 
the use of “harm” to discount therapeutic amputation for 
people with BIID is an instructive counterexample to both 
the normativity of statistical normality and the common-
sense deployment of harm as a prescriptive principle. 
Relatedly, we should be very worried that there are a host 
of conditions that were previously thought to be suffered 
and constitute harm that, with critically informed research, 
prove, in fact, fruitful, gainful, and rich forms of life.47 If it 
is indeed the case, as I find it to be, that “it is controversial 
whether and how to draw a line between those lives that 
are worth living and those that are not,” then we need 
much more critical empirical and reflective work on the 
experience of lives on or near that line—a line, it bears 
continually repeating, that is more often than not drawn 
intuitively by the able-bodied and thus drawn with what 
should be prima facie suspicion, not support.
Across academic scholarship, especially of a critical sort, 
there is consensus, if any can be said to exist, about a 
very small subset of lives not worth living. Accordingly, 
bioethicists should have very little confidence in judgments 
over lives deemed not worth living or lives said to have 
intrinsically or necessarily low QOL. There is an alarming 
lack of what Eva Kittay insightfully terms epistemic 
responsibility and epistemic modesty on the part of a wide 
swath of bioethicists when it comes to judgment about non-
normate lives, about lives lived with and through disability.48 
If bioethicists and ethicists more generally wish to have a 
better grasp on the conditions and particularities of lives 
worth living, more critical reflection is required concerning 
the way in which the concept of harm has historically been 
used to end lives, not enrich them.
NOTES
1. Johnson, Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science 
for Ethics, 199.
2. Brennan, The Transmission of Affect, 119.
3. This paper is a significantly revised and expanded form of a 
presentation given at the 2016 Society for Disability Studies 
and at the 2016 Eastern APA as part of a session for the Society 
for Philosophy of Disability. I am grateful to each audience for 
constructive and provocative feedback. Jennifer Scuro and 
Lauren Guilmette gave insightful and incisive feedback at every 
stage of the project. David Peña-Guzmán and Katherine Davies 
also provided extremely helpful comments on its penultimate 
draft. This piece forms part of a much larger project, stemming 
from my dissertation and its revision into monograph form, that 
focuses on the history of what I call the “ableist conflation”: the 
conflation of disability with pain and suffering. More specifically, 
this is the assumption—attested across myriad philosophical 
traditions and epochs—that disability is a harm and concomitant 
Disabled or non-disabled, our intuitions are deeply 
unreliable as normative grounds. Humans exhibit 
durability bias, the tendency to overpredict the duration of 
affective reactions, however grounded, to future events. 
Furthermore, this is due in part to focalism, the tendency to 
focus too much on an event in one’s immediate attentional 
field and not consequences of other future events.43 
In short, we predictably misremember, misrepresent, 
and mispredict both past and future states of happiness 
and sadness, pleasure and pain, in relation to singular 
events, not to mention complex sets of events.44 Focalism 
also contributes to pain catastrophizing, the fact that we 
regularly overestimate the intensity and duration of pain.45 
This further suggests that we significantly mischaracterize, 
mispredict, and generally misestimate the meaning of any 
phenomenon we assume to cause pain; this includes the 
vast range of phenomena we categorize as “disabilities,” 
phenomena we, thanks to the ableist conflation, 
fallaciously associate or equate with pain and suffering.46 
To the extent that we deploy applications of abstract 
statistical norms to our own happiness and thereby pose 
normative determinations concerning its attainment, we—
given psychological evidence about our memory and 
prognostications concerning well-being—are not relying 
on thin knowledge or thin norms: we are relying on little 
more than fictions. Statistical normality is not sufficient 
for predictions of happiness and, a fortiori, sufficient as a 
ground for normative judgment, even if only in reference to 
questions of distributive justice.
As K&S themselves note, the ultimate problem that efforts 
of such a kind face is the fact that “it’s not especially clear 
how to draw a distinction between good and bad lives, 
as opposed to better and worse ones. It is controversial 
whether and how to draw a line between those lives that 
are worth living and those that are not—but it’s at least clear 
that the latter must contain extreme, unremitting suffering 
that can’t be relieved” (322). If that (absolutely crucial) 
distinction is not especially clear, then is not the ethicist in 
the same position as any other researcher before a complex, 
ambiguous, and normatively fraught phenomena? Given 
the remarkable unreliability of intuitions, especially as they 
relate to hedonic considerations, one must substantially 
engage empirical and reflective research on these issues, 
both positive and critical in nature. One must also, given 
the entrenchment of ableism, give extra weight to the 
testimony of those who actually experience the conditions, 
states, or forms of life to which bioethicists refer. I hope to 
have demonstrated that more engagement with the body 
of work across critical disability studies and philosophy 
of disability would benefit a host of bioethical debates, 
especially those involving concepts of harm and well-
being.
IV. TAKING ABLEISM IN (BIO)ETHICS SERIOUSLY
A naturalized ethics, one which grounds its principles 
in the concrete experiences of the beings for whom its 
prescriptions are thought to bear, is an ethics beholden to 
the structures and singularities of experiences. Thus, while 
I do not deny that statistical normality plays a practical role 
with respect to normative judgments, I think a better route 
to ground such judgments is through a critical synthesis 
of empirical and reflective evidence about lives attested 
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Taxonomies, Identity Disorders, and Persistent Unexplained 
Physical Symptoms”; Mackenzie, “Somatechnics of Medico-
Legal Taxonomies: Elective Amputation and Transableism.”
11. Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections 
On Disability; Wendell, “Unhealthy Disabled: Treating Chronic 
Illnesses as Disabilities.”
12. Spriggs, “Lesbian Couple Create a Child Who Is Deaf Like Them.”
13. Bauman, Deaf Gain Raising the Stakes for Human Diversity. I will 
return to the question of disability-gain or what Elizabeth Barnes 
calls “good-difference” views of disability below. Barnes, The 
Minority Body, Studies In Feminist Philosophy Series. I should 
add that I highly, highly recommend that book for anyone 
wishing to educate themselves concerning ongoing arguments 
in philosophy of disability.
14. “Why Chloe Needlessly Spends Her Life in a Wheelchair,” on 
Anderson Cooper 360° (CNN, 2012).
15. Fiona Kumari Campbell, Contours of Ableism: The Production of 
Disability and Abledness (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
Part of this relates to the question of the relationship of BIID to 
erotic desire. See De Preester, “Merleau-Ponty’s Sexual Schema 
and the Sexual Component of Body Integrity Identity Disorder.”
16. Gensler, Ethics and the Golden Rule; Wattles, The Golden Rule.
17. Silvers, “Reconciling Equality to Difference: Caring (F)or Justice 
for People with Disabilities,” 37.
18. Elliot, “A New Way to Be Mad.”
19. Tuttle, “People Who Cut Off Their Own Limbs (and Their Enablers).”
20. There are, in fact, multiple social models, and for any given form 
of it, there is vigorous debate across the breadth of disability 
studies’ scholarship over its meaning, scope, etc. There is a 
copious literature debating the merits and many meanings of 
this distinction which I cannot engage here. As a primer, see 
Davis, The Disability Studies Reader, 4th ed. The newest, fifth 
edition of the DSR is forthcoming.
21. In addition to her other work cited above, this is especially clear 
in Davis, “Narrative Constuction.”
22. See Scuro, “The Ableist Affections of a Neoliberal Politics,” APA 
Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine (Current Issue); Scuro, 
“Thinking of Bhopal: Women’s Bodies as Waste-Sites.” 
23. I address the conflation of various forms of disability with lack 
and harm at length in Reynolds, “‘I’d Rather Be Dead Than 
Disabled.’ See note 3 above. I am grateful to David Peña-Guzmán 
for pushing me on the possibility of a more general ableism 
(beyond mere disability stigma) potentially at work in the lack of 
identification with “disability” by those diagnosed with BIID.
24. Despite the large amount of research on BIID, I find that more 
analyses of the lived experience of people with BIID is requisite, 
especially qualitative sociological and critical phenomenological 
research (see note 10 above, especially the work of Jenny L. 
Davis). In relation to my claim regarding blindness, see Reynolds, 
“On Being Outside The (Normate) Body: Merleau-Ponty’s Aveugle 
and Crip Phenomenology,” forthcoming.
25. Kahane and Savulescu, “The Concept of Harm and the Significance 
of Normality,” 318. On the leading body modification website 
“Modblog,” a person going under the pseudonym Jason is 
interviewed about the “accident” he successfully staged in order 
to cut off his right arm below the elbow with a power tool. Jason 
identities himself as a “body-integrity-disorder (BIID) dude” and 
says, “for sure it’s not rational to want to cut off your arm or leg. 
There’s no argument you can make that life will be easier, or 
that you’ll be more capable doing anything.” Larratt, “One Hand 
Jason: BIID Interview in BME/News.”
26. Some distinguish between disadvantage and harm, a practice I 
will not follow here.
27. Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th 
ed. What is called the “harm principle” originates from John 
Stuart Mill (On Liberty, 13). In political philosophy since, including 
offshoots or variations ranging from critical theory to critical 
international relations theory, there is significant discussion over 
the role and nature of this principle and the concept of harm it 
assumes. I cannot address these issues here. See, e.g., Brincat, 
“The Harm Principle and Recognition Theory.”
with pain and suffering. See also Joel Michael Reynolds, “‘I’d 
Rather Be Dead Than Disabled’: The Ableist Conflation and the 
Meanings of Disability” (forthcoming).
4. Philosophers including Eva Kittay, Anita Silvers, Licia Carlson, 
Martha Nussbaum, and Shelley Tremain have each done 
significant work critiquing and/or amending such ideals.
5. Wolbring, “Ethical Theories and Discourses through an Ability 
Expectations and Ableism Lens: The Case of Enhancement 
and Global Regulation”; Wolbring, “Ability Privilege: A Needed 
Addition to Privilege Studies,” Journal for Critical Animal Studies.
6. Stramondo, “Why Bioethics Needs a Disability Moral Psychology.”
7. As I discuss below, “transabled” is a term some people who have 
been diagnosed with or experience what is categorized as BIID 
use to identify themselves. Transability, then, is not identical 
with BIID. The latter is a medical diagnosis, one which is still 
being contested along with terms such as apotemnophilia and 
somatoparaphrenia et al. “Transability,” on the other hand, is a 
more politically charged marker of identity and, depending upon 
one’s situation, also community. See note 10 below. Because it is 
currently the most accepted term in the literature of bioethics and 
philosophy of disability, I primarily use the term BIID throughout 
this paper.
8. No sufficient statistical research has been carried out to 
determine the precise percentage of people living with BIID. 
Estimates, however, suggest that it is well below 1 percent of 
the population.
9. Muller, “Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID)—Is the Amputation 
of Healthy Limbs Ethically Justified?”
10. Research on BIID has exploded in recent years, including 
scholarship in fields ranging across sociology, psychology, 
cognitive neuroscience, critical disability studies (including, 
especially, English and literary theory), bioethics, philosophy 
of disability, feminist philosophy, queer theory, and trans* 
studies, among others. I thus take what I highlight here to be 
in no way exhaustive. After finishing this paper, I became 
aware of the dissertation of Christine Marie Wieseler, “A 
Feminist Contestation of Ableist Assumptions: Implications 
for Biomedical Ethics, Disability Theory, and Phenomenology” 
(University of South Florida, 2016, http://scholarcommons.usf.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7629&context=etd). The fifth 
and final chapter focuses on BIID and, besides being remarkably 
insightful, it is the most comprehensive analysis I have read on 
the subject. Needless to say, I highly recommend it. The first 
research, as far as I’m aware, on what is now called BIID is: John 
Money, Russell Jobaris, and Gregg Furth, “Apotemnophilia: 
Two Cases of Self-Demand Amputation as a Paraphilia.” With 
respect to neurological literature, one of the first studies is 
Brang, McGeoch, and Ramachandran, “Apotemnophilia: A 
Neurological Disorder.” The following article attempts to bring 
together the psychological and neurological findings: First and 
Fisher, “Body Integrity Identity Disorder: The Persistent Desire to 
Acquire a Physical Disability.” For a critique of the epistemology 
of neurological etiologies with respect to such phenomena, 
see Fisher and First, “Examining the “Neuro-” in Neurodiversity: 
Lessons from Body Integrity Identity Disorder.” For key pieces in 
queer and trans* studies, see especially, Susan Stryker and Nikki 
Sullivan, ‘‘King’s Member, Queen’s Body: Transsexual Surgery, 
Self-Demand Amputation, and the Somatechnics of Sovereign 
Power,” in Nikki Sullivan and Samantha Murray, Somatechnics: 
Queering The Technologisation of Bodies, Queer Interventions; 
Baril, “‘How Dare You Pretend To Be Disabled?’ The Discounting 
of Transabled People and Their Claims in Disability Movements 
and Studies”; Baril, “Needing to Acquire a Physical Impairment/
Disability: (Re)Thinking the Connections between Trans and 
Disability Studies through Transability”; Arfini, “Instructions for 
Becoming Disabled: A Narrative Analysis of the Project of the 
Transabled Body (Istruzioni per diventare disabili: Un’analisi 
narrativa del progetto sul corpo transabile)”; Arfini, “Transability.” 
For work in critical disability studies, see Noson, “From 
Superabilità To Transabilità: Towards An Italian Disability Studies”; 
Stevens, “Interrogating Transability: A Catalyst to View Disability 
as Body Art.” In sociology, Jenny L. Davis has written insightfully 
and extensively on the topic: Davis, “Morality Work Among the 
Transabled”; Davis, “Narrative Construction of a Ruptured Self: 
Stories of Transability on Transabled.org”; Davis, “Prosuming 
Identity: The Production and Consumption of Transableism 
on Transabled.org.” In legal studies, see Mackenzie and Cox, 
“Transableism, Disability and Paternalism In Public Health Ethics: 
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42. There is yet another issue that impedes the WSN. The examples 
of both (1) and (2) are both biologically and statistically 
exceptional—they fall on the edges of the phenotypical bell curve 
for homo sapiens. As the authors note at one point, substances 
or genetic manipulation could make the abilities of (2) a live 
option for those with enough societal and economic resources 
in the near future. That the examples of (2) could quickly move 
closer to being of a kind with (1) should give even more pause 
to the merit of statistical normativity. In short, while biological 
normativity is little more than dogmatic prejudice, statistical 
normativity is little more than such prejudice held in the sway of 
an ethics of comparativity. In another passage, after discussing 
how the descriptive nature of statistical normality accounts for its 
theoretic use (its use for providing explanations and predictions 
of wellbeing), Kahane and Savulescu turn to discuss its normative 
use, which they gloss as its ability to mark reasons for action and 
attitude (323–24). They note that “harm and disadvantage are 
not only explanatory notions. They also typically have normative 
significance” (324). “Typically” with respect to who and what 
domain? I agree that such concepts are typically thought by many 
bioethicists to have normative significance. But, to repeat a point 
from above, the application of the concept of harm to justify all 
sorts of horrors across biomedical history suggests that the way 
in which harm and disadvantage typically have and have had 
normative significance is itself fraught and should precipitate 
prima facie suspicion, not support. While, to be clear, there is 
much to appreciate in Kahane and Savulescu’s article and in their 
genuine efforts to engage research in disability studies as well 
as testimony from people living with disabilities throughout their 
inquiry, I am left unconvinced that there is a meaningful moral 
distinction between biological normality and statistical normality.
43. Wilson et al., “Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective 
Forecasting.” See also discussions of focusing effect in Schkade 
and Kahneman, “Does Living in California Make People Happy? A 
Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction.”
44. Wilson, Meyers, and Gilbert, “”How Happy Was I, Anyway?” A 
Retrospective Impact Bias.”
45. Day and Thorn, “The Relationship of Demographic and 
Psychosocial Variables to Pain-Related Outcomes in a Rural 
Chronic Pain Population.”
46. See notes 23 and 3 above. 
47. Lantos, “Trisomy 13 and 18--Treatment Decisions in a Stable Gray 
Zone.”
48. Kittay, Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency. 
Put otherwise, there needs to be, specifically and especially for 
able-bodied bioethicists, what Lauren Guilmette terms “curiosity 
deployed in the mode of care” for the myriad and vast range 
of experiences of disability. Guilmette, “Feminist Philosophies of 
Disability, Foucault, and the Ethics of Curiosity”; Guilmette, “In 
What We Tend to Feel Is Without History: Foucault, Affect, and the 
Ethics of Curiosity.”
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